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Abstract: The error correcting codes are a common tool to ensure safety in
various safety-related systems. The usual technique, employed in the past, is
to use two independent transmission systems and to send the safety relevant
message two times. This article focuses on analysis of the detection properties
of this strategy in the binary symmetrical channel (BSC) model.
Besides, various modifications of the mentioned technique can be used. Their
impact on the detection properties can be significant, positively or negatively.
This article demonstrates one of these modifications.
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1. Introduction
Communication safety is a small, but important part of the safety of every
electronics-based system, particularly in railway interlocking systems. A special
position in this issue has the safety code, because it is the unique tool to protect
messages against corruption.
The basic motivation for this paper was the cooperation on design of interlocking
systems. The communication protocol, used by our partner, includes sending the
safety relevant messages twice using two transmission lines. It turns up, that safety
analysis of this simple approach is not quite simple.
The first part of the article describes some basic terms of coding theory. The
second part introduces the concept of probability of undetected error in the binary
symmetrical channel as a basic tool for evaluating detection quality of the code. The
next part investigates the main approaches to message doubling. The problem of
calculating the probability of an undetected error in these cases is studied.
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2. Coding theory
This section defines the basic terminology for linear binary codes and the related
binary symmetrical channel (BSC) model. The “code-related” terminology in this
paper is based on terms used in the mathematical coding theory (see for example [2]).
2.1. Linear binary codes
A linear binary (n, k)−code K is any k−dimensional subspace of the space (Z2)n.
Traditionally, binary vectors from (Z2)
n are called words ; the words from the code K
are the code words. In an (n, k)−code the code word length is n, the number of
information bits is equal to k and the number of redundant bits is equal to c = n−k.
Any linear (n, k)−code K can be described by its generator matrix, whose rows are
exactly the words forming a basis of the subspace K.
In practice, usually the code word of an (n, k)−code is created by the addition
of c bits (the redundant or control part of the code word) to a word of length k (the
information part of the code word). This technique is called a systematic encoding,
the code is a systematic code. A generator matrix of the systematic code has the
form G = (E|B), where E denotes the identity matrix of the order k and B is some
k × c matrix.
2.2. Error detection
During the transfer of a message unwanted modifications can occur. Usually, it is
supposed that a number of bits is preserved and these modifications are manifested
by altered bit(s). The adverse situation occurs, when the modification during transfer
unfortunately creates another code word, different from the sent one. The receiver
has no possibility to recognize this state.
This scenario is dangerous and results in an undetected error. The probability of
such an undetected error of the detection codes used in safety relevant applications
(including transportation control) is a very important safety parameter.
We define the Hamming weight of a word as the count of non-zero bits in the
word. Then we define the minimal distance of a linear code as the smallest non-zero
Hamming weight of its code word.
The minimal distance of a linear code sets the ability of the code to detect some
classes of transmission errors. A code with a minimal distance d will detect all errors
with at most d− 1 modified bits in the transmitted code word (see [2, 3]).
For a more detailed description of the code, a weight structure of the code is
defined as a vector A = (A0, A1, A2, . . . , An), where Ai denotes the number of code
words with Hamming weight equal to i. For linear codes, the weight structure is
fully sufficient for the description of its ability to detect errors.
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3. Probability of undetected error
The most useful approach for measuring the detection properties of a code uses
its maximal value of the probability of undetected error in a binary symmetrical
channel.
3.1. Description of the BSC model
The binary symmetrical channel (BSC) is a simple probabilistic model based on
a bit (binary symbol) transmission. The BSC model does not describe the reality
completely, but it is an appropriate tool for comparison of the detection properties
of the codes.
In this model the probability of an error is supposed to be independent from one
bit to the next one. The probability pe that the bit changes its value during the
transmission (bit error rate) is the same for both possibilities (0 → 1 and 1 → 0).
The probability that the code word with n symbols is corrupted exactly in i symbols
is then equal to
pie (1− pe)
n−i . (1)
The probability of an undetected error in the BSC model for a linear binary
code K with code words of length n and with minimal Hamming distance d is given






where Ai is the number of code words with exactly i nonzero symbols and pe is the
bit error rate in the BSC channel.
For every linear (n, k)−code the value of the function Pud(K, .) for pe = 1/2 is
equal to (2k − 1)/2n and this is a local maximum of this function. Although the
use of a transmission channel with bit error rate near to 1/2 is virtually excluded,
the standard EN 50159 for safety-related communication in railway applications [1]
recommends not to use a better detection estimate than this value for calculations
in a safety model.
Actually, for the codes used in safety relevant applications it is necessary to
know (or, at least, estimate) an upper bound of the function Pud(K, .) on the entire
interval [0, 1/2]. In particular, it is recommended to use codes with a monotone
function Pud(K, .) or, at least, this function should not exceed the value Pud(K, 1/2)
(see [1]).
3.2. Indirect calculation using dual code
The formula (2) for the probability of an undetected error of a code is quite
simple in principle. However, the coefficients Ai (the number of code words with
i nonzero symbols) cannot be expressed by some elegant formula (with exception of
rare family of codes). They have to be calculated by counting the weight of every
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individual code word. As the number of code words is equal to 2k, these calculations
are not feasible for long code words.
To get more effective calculations, it is useful to apply the MacWilliams Identity,
which links the weight structure of the given code and its dual code. These compu-
tations use another representation of the weight structure by the weight enumerator







We define for the binary words u = u1u2 . . . un and v = v1v2 . . . vn
u · v =
n∑
i=1
ui · vi. (4)
This bilinear form is usually referred as inner product, despite it does not satisfy
condition that from u · u = 0 follows u = (0, 0, . . . , 0). This is a consequence of the
fact that in the space Z2 it is 1 + 1 = 0.
A dual code to the linear binary (n, k)−codeK is a linear binary (n, n−k)−codeK⊥
consisting from all words u ∈ (Z2)n, whose inner product with every code word from
the code K is equal to zero:
u ∈ K⊥ ⇐⇒ u · v = 0 for every v ∈ K. (5)
If the code K is a systematic code with generator matrix G = (E|B), where
E is the identity matrix and B is some k × c matrix, then the dual code K⊥ has
a generator matrix G⊥ = (BT|E), where BT is the transposed of the matrix B.
3.2.2. MacWilliams Identity
The following formula is the MacWilliams Identity for binary codes:







The advantage of this formula is that the dual code has much fewer code words
(2n−k << 2k, because typically, n − k = c << k) and then it is significantly easier
to compute the weight distribution for a dual code.
4. Message doubling
A natural procedure to ensure authenticity of the message is to use two inde-
pendent transmission systems and to send the safety relevant message twice. The
received message is considered undamaged only if both copies are delivered and theirs
contents are matching.
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The situation with a missing message is trivial, so we focus only on the case
when both copies arrived and their length is preserved (verification of the correct
length of the message is done by other techniques). In the BSC model (independent
transmission of single symbols – bits), it is equivalent to a serial transmission using
a single transmission channel.
4.1. Repetition of the message
A plain repetition of the message with length equal to k is represented by the






for j = 0, . . . , k (7)
A2j−1 = 0 for j = 1, . . . , k. (8)
The minimal distance of the code is equal to 2, which is insufficient for most purposes.
More useful is a repetition of the message already protected by some linear
code. Consider a binary message of length k. This message we protect by a lin-
ear binary (n, k)-code KA with minimal distance d and with known weight structure
A = (A0, A1, A2, . . . , An). Then we send this message twice.
This procedure corresponds to the protection of the message with linear binary
(2n, k)−code KD. The minimal distance of this code is equal to 2d and its weight
structure, denoted as D = (D0, D1, D2, . . . , Dn), is given by the weight structure of
the code KA:
D2j = Aj for j = 0, . . . , n (9)
D2j−1 = 0 for j = 1, . . . , n. (10)














Pud(KD, .) < Pud(KA, .). (12)
The following graph illustrates the situation for one sample code with length
n = 32 and with c = 8 control bits. (Note: it is a shortened cyclic code generated
by the polynomial x8 + x7 + x2 + 1 – for explanation see e. g. [3].) The upper curve
represents the probability of an undetected error for the sample code, the lower curve
represents the corresponding probability with repetition of the message. The vertical
axis is in logarithmic scale.
Let us consider the lower bound of the function Pud(KA, .) as a Ad p
d
e(1− pe)n−d.
The ratio between the lower bounds for the codes KD and KA is p
d
e(1− pe)n−d, and
the minimal improvement is obtained for pe = d/n. Hence with increased length n
the maximal value of the lower bound decreases significantly slower than the value
Pud(KD, pe). From this it is evident that the minimal distance is a very important
parameter, which has a dominant influence to the detection properties of doubling
messages.
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Figure 1: The probability of an undetected error for the sample code (upper curve)
and for the same code combined with repetition of the message. Horizontal axis: bit
error rate pe, vertical axis: logarithm of probability of undetected error Pud(pe).
4.2. Double encoding of the message
In some situations a more sophisticated approach can be useful. We protect
a binary message M of length k by a linear binary (n, k)−code KA with known
weight structure A = (A0, A1, A2, . . . , An); we denote this encoded message by MA.
Then we repeat this procedure with the original message M and with another linear
binary (n, k)−code KB with weight structure B = (B0, B1, B2, . . . , Bn); denote the
encoded message by MB. Finally we send both messages MA and MB using two
separate transmission lines.
One advantage of this approach is that the received messages are “signed” – if
one of the messages MA and MB is wrong, we know on which transmission line (or
in which encoder) the failure occurred. More important, this technique protects
against the situation, when two copies of one received message are handled as two
independent messages.
4.2.1. Weight structure
The two-transmission-lines configuration is in the BSC model equivalent with
transmission of concatenated messages MA and MB. This corresponds with some
linear binary (2n, k)−code KAB. Unfortunately, the weight structure of the code KAB
cannot be derived from the weight structures of the codes KA and KB. However,
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the number of information bits k is equal for all three codes KA, KB and KAB and
therefore if the calculation of the weight structure of the codes KA, KB is manageable,
then for the code KAB the computation is practicable as well.
The questionable situation occurs, when the number of information bits k is too
high and it is impossible to generate 2k code words in a reasonable time. The dual
codes to the KA and KB are (n, n− k)−codes, and if the number of the redundant
bits c = n − k is acceptably small, it is possible to compute the weight structures
of these duals and then use the MacWilliams identity (6) to compute the weight
structures of the codes KA and KB.
However, the dual code to the code KAB is a (2n, n+ c)−code and generation of
the 2n+c code words may be impossible, as in a typical case the number of information
bits k is considerably greater than the number of control bits c = n−k. This problem
can be solved by utilization of the special form of the code dual to KAB.
Let us assume that the codes KA and KB are systematic codes. This is a rea-
sonable assumption, because every linear code is equivalent with a systematic code.
Then the codes KA and KB have generator matrices in the form GA = (E|A) and
GB = (E|B), respectively. A generator matrix of the code KAB is GAB = (E|A|E|B),
and there exists an equivalent generator matrix (E|E|A|B). Then a generator matrix
of the dual code K⊥AB has the following form:
G⊥AB =
 E E 0 0AT 0 E 0
BT 0 0 E
 , (13)








derived from the G⊥AB, is a generator matrix of some (k + 2c, 2c)−code K∗. In
the favourable case it is acceptable to generate 22c code words and enumerate their
weights.
Computation of the weight structure of the code KAB is based on more detailed
information about weights of the code words of the code K∗. Rather than the weight
structure we compute a matrix of weight structures. We split a code word into two
parts: the information part of length 2c and the control part of length k. Then we
construct a matrix N = (nij), where nij is the number of code words of the code K
∗
with weight of the information part equal to i and weight of the control part equal
to j.
Every code word of the code K⊥AB is the sum of two words v + w:
• v = (u, u, o), where u is an arbitrary binary word of length k and o is a zero
vector of length 2c, and
• w = (w1, o, w2), where (w1, w2) is a code word of the code K∗ (w1 consists of
its first k bits, w2 is the rest) and o is a zero vector of length k.
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Consider a word w with weight of w1 equal to i and weight of w2 equal to j. We
add to this word every possible word of the type v = (u, u, o). For every position,
where it is one in the word w1 and zero in the word u, the weight of the sum v + w





words with weight i + j + 2m.
The number of these words w is 2jnij. Adding these contributions for all indices i
and j we obtain the desired weight structure of the code K⊥AB and finally by means
of the MacWilliams Identity (6) the weight structure of the code KAB.
This procedure is quite complicated, nevertheless, our computations show, that
for a code with 16 control bits it is fully manageable on ordinary personal computer.
4.2.2. Upper estimate of Pud(KAB, .)
In case the enumeration of the 22c code words of the code K∗ is computationally
too difficult, but 2c code words of the codes KA and KB is still computationally
accessible, we can estimate the maximal value of Pud(KAB, .) by the following con-
struction.
We use the known weight structures A = (A0, A1, . . . , An) of the code KA and B =
(B0, B1, . . . , Bn) of the code KB to create a new weight structure C = (C0, C1, . . . , Cn)
of the fictive code Kf . The value of Ci we define as the maximum value of Ai, Bi.
Then we consider doubling of the message with this fictive code Kf as described
in Section 4.1 and enumerate the upper bound of the Pud(Kf , .). This is the upper
bound for the function Pud(KAB, .) as well.
5. Conclusions
Repetition of the message is a natural and undemanding method of protecting its
content. In the safety relevant applications it is not a sufficient technique. Therefore,
more sophisticated variations of this principle can be useful as additional defence.
Providing the probabilistic analysis of the code using some of these variants of
message doubling is surprisingly complicated. Nevertheless, an effective, though not
elegant, method for necessary computations was developed.
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